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David Tepper Giving Carnegie Mellon a $67 Million Gift

A century ago, giants of America’s Gilded Age started the educational institutions that later became Carnegie Mellon University.

On Friday, Carnegie Mellon will announce a major gift from a product of a new gilded age, the hedge fund billionaire David A. Tepper.

Mr. Tepper has given the school $67 million, the largest donation in its history, bringing his total giving to Carnegie Mellon in the last decade to more than $125 million.

“Carnegie Mellon tied everything together for me and gave me a great foundation,” said Mr. Tepper, founder of Appaloosa Management and a graduate of the university’s b usiness school. “My earlier gifts were a payback to the university, and this is a continuation of that.”

The donation to Carnegie Mellon comes amid a spate of mammoth gifts to universities during the past year: Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg of New York announced a $350 million pledge to Johns Hopkins. The mutual fund billionaire Charles B. Johnson donated $250 million to Yale. The real estate developer Stephen M. Ross unveiled a $200 million gift to the University of Michigan. And Frank H. McCourt Jr., a real estate developer, has given $100 million to Georgetown.

“The tremendous wealth creation in this country has inured to the benefit of higher education,” said Patrick Rooney, associate dean for academic affairs and research at the Indiana University Lilly Family School of Philanthropy. “Inherent in these major gifts is a deep pride and sense of ownership that these donors take in their alma maters.”

Mr. Tepper hopes that his gift will help improve Carnegie Mellon’s reputation and rankings. It will create a new academic hub on the university’s Pittsburgh campus to be called the David A. Tepper Quadrangle.

The money will also help finance the construction of a 300,000-square-foot building that will be home to the university’s Tepper School of Business. And it will provide a new welcome center and improved facilities, including larger classrooms, a fitness center and a cafe.

The announcement of the donation is to come on the same day as the formal installation of Carnegie Mellon’s new president, Subra Suresh, who assumed his post in July. In an interview, Mr. Suresh, an engineer and scientist, extolled the school’s reputation as a hotbed of innovation.

“This will enhance the entrepreneurship that already exists on campus,” said Mr. Subresh, who served as director of the National Science Foundation from 2010 to 2013.

Mr. Tepper, 56, the son of an accountant and schoolteacher, grew up middle class in Pittsburgh. He attended the University of Pittsburgh and earned his graduate degree in business from Carnegie Mellon. He started Appaloosa in 1993 after a stint at Goldman Sachs, where he helped run high-yield bond trading.

Based in Short Hills, N.J., Appaloosa has $20 billion in assets under management, making it one of the world’s largest hedge funds. In 2012, Mr. Tepper earned $2.2 billion, which, according to Institutional Investor’s Alpha, made him the country’s highest paid hedge-fund manager.

In 2009, Mr. Tepper made an estimated $4 billion with big, contrarian bets on the battered shares of Bank of America and Citigroup. That same year, he purchased an ownership stake in the Pittsburgh Steelers football team.

After Mr. Tepper gave Carnegie Mellon’s business school $55 million in 2004, it was renamed after him.

The university was started by Andrew Carnegie in 1900 as the Carnegie Technical Schools. In 1967, that school, which had become the Carnegie Institute of Technology, merged with the Mellon Institute, a nearby institution founded by Andrew W. Mellon and Richard B. Mellon.

Distinguishing himself from the school’s original benefactor, Mr. Tepper noted that Mr. Carnegie became philanthropic in the later stage of his career.

“I’m still young,” Mr. Tepper said. “These days I think you’re seeing people become conscious of giving back a little earlier.”



U.S. Investigates Currency Trades by Major Banks

From their desks at some of the world’s biggest banks, traders exchanged a series of instant messages that earned them the nickname “the cartel.”

Much like companies that rigged the price of vitamins and animal feed, the traders were competitors that hatched alliances for their own profits, federal investigators suspect.

The group of traders, the investigators say, shared a mission to alter the price of foreign currencies, the largest and yet least regulated market in the financial world. And ultimately, they flooded the market with trades that potentially raised the cost of currency for clients but aided the banks’ own investments.

Now the instant messages, along with similar activity among other traders, are at the center of an international investigation into banks like Barclays, the Royal Bank of Scotland and Citigroup, according to recent public disclosures by the banks and interviews with investigators who spoke on the condition of anonymity. The investigators secured the cooperation of at least one trader, a development that has not been previously disclosed.

Although the investigation is at an early stage, authorities are already signaling the likelihood of a legal crackdown.

“The manipulation we’ve seen so far may just be the tip of the iceberg,” the United States Attorney General, Eric H. Holder Jr., said in a rare interview discussing an active investigation. “We’ve recognized that this is potentially an extremely consequential investigation.”

The banks all declined to comment. No one has been accused of wrongdoing, and any improper actions probably would have involved only a corner of the overall market. One former member of the group called the “cartel” has told colleagues that the nickname reflected the traders’ success, not any improper collusion, according to a person briefed on the group. The group was informal, the person said, and its name came from outside traders.

But coming fast on the heels of a similar investigation into the rigging of global interest rates, the latest scrutiny has unnerved the world’s biggest banks, setting off internal scrambles to contain the damage. Nine of the largest banks in currency trading have announced they are facing inquiries. The banks placed about a dozen traders on leave pending the outcome of the inquiry. And several banks are considering limiting the ability of their traders to chat electronically.

The priority that investigators are giving the case, which focuses on trading over the last decade, reflects the significance of the market in the world’s major currencies itself. With trading of more than $5 trillion a day, it dwarfs any stock or bond market.

Further underscoring its importance, pension funds and other investment managers value their portfolios using a benchmark of the currency market. An independent service publishes that benchmark, which is at the center of the investigation.

Despite the market’s importance to how goods and services are priced across national borders, it is one that is vulnerable to manipulation. Governments have imposed only scant regulation on the trading and there is no exchange to publicly detail the price of trades. Instead, the banks that dominate the market â€" Deutsche Bank, Citigroup, Barclays and UBS account for about half of all trading â€" control the information.

“This is a very opaque market and it would be good to investigate and know it better,” said Dagfinn Rime, a senior researcher at Norway’s central bank.

The Justice Department’s criminal and antitrust divisions, Mr. Holder said, are “taking a leading role” in the “truly global investigation.”

Authorities in Britain, the European Union, Switzerland and Hong Kong are also scrutinizing the trading activity. And alongside the Justice Department in Washington, investigators say, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission has opened its own investigation.

The investigations were born from the last major financial scandal, the rigging of interest rate benchmarks known as the London interbank offered rate, or Libor. Many of the same banks currently under investigation in the currency case, including Barclays, have already paid large fines to settle the Libor cases. And some banks discovered problems in the currency market after reviewing their broader trading practices at the government’s urging, the authorities involved in the case say.

The inquiry could hinge on instant messages that traders typed into private chat rooms.

Authorities say they suspect that traders used the chat rooms to lay out their strategies. The traders, using information gleaned from their clients, are suspected of agreeing to flood the market with orders for currencies at an opportune time each day.

That time came just seconds before an independent service, WM Company, set some of the benchmark rates. The most important rate is based on trades in a period shortly before 4 p.m. London time, so a flurry of last-second orders from banks could alter the rate in their favor. For example, if a customer wanted to buy some euros, a bank would seek to drive up the rate before selling the euros to clients at an inflated price.

The trading group called “the cartel,” or “the bandits club,” included employees from R.B.S. and UBS, people briefed on the investigation say. It is unclear when the group was operational or if it ever crossed a legal line.

The former member of the group told colleagues that individual client names weren’t discussed in the electronic chat rooms. Instead, the traders occasionally discussed positions in an effort to match buyers and sellers, according to the person briefed on the group.

The market for buying and selling foreign currencies â€" which can range from basic corporate transactions to highly complex derivative deals struck by hedge funds â€" has grown explosively over the last decade, experiencing barely a hiccup during the financial crisis.

It has also become a major profit center for many global banking giants, which make money by capturing their share of the trading flow of stocks, bonds, currencies and derivatives. For these “flow monsters,” the name of the game is volume, as intense global competition and technological innovation continue to compress profit margins.

For years, the leaders in the foreign exchange market have been Deutsche Bank and Citigroup, which control 30 percent of the market. In recent years, the two banks have engaged in an arms race of sorts, investing large amounts of cash to build their own web-based proprietary trading platforms â€" Autobahn for Deutsche and Velocity for Citigroup. To a degree, these portals function as in-house exchanges, in which the bank matches buyers with sellers.

Unlike in a traditional securities exchange, however, where the entire market knows who is buying and selling what at a given moment and can react accordingly, what goes on inside Autobahn, Velocity and the other exclusive platforms is known only to the banks themselves.

“These portals are like ‘dark pools,’ and they represent a major profit center for banks like Deutsche, Citigroup and Barclays,” said Michael R. King, an expert on currency trading. “But there is little transparency and that should concern regulators.”

While the portals are not a focus of the investigation by authorities, they underscore how such a large, global and liquid market can still be so opaque.

It is only through a yearly survey conducted by the trade publication Euromoney that major institutions’ shares in the foreign exchange market are disclosed. Deutsche Bank topped last year’s, with a 15.1 percent share of the market, followed by Citigroup at 14.9 percent.

Citigroup’s fight for market share has included offering cheaper pricing on foreign exchange deals and wooing clients by linking increased volume to charitable donations. Yet amid the gamesmanship, there have been concerns that the market could be prone to manipulation.

Whether banks that control the market through their web portals have an inside edge was examined earlier this year in a paper

titled “Information Flows in Dark Markets: Dissecting Customer Currency Trades.” Read by both regulators and bankers, the paper concluded that “order flows are highly informative about future exchange rates and provide significant economic value for the few large dealers who have access to these flows.”

Richard K. Lyons, the dean of the business school at the University of California, Berkeley, offered an explanation. Pretend, he said, that the currency market is 1,000 people playing poker and that eight of them have seen 10 percent of what is going on in the market while the rest have seen less than 1 percent.

“Do the big banks make money from this advantage? Yes, they do,” he said. “Is it a ton of money? No.”



Chief’s Vision for Morgan Stanley Is Showing Some Success

Thunderclouds were gathering in April when James P. Gorman, Morgan Stanley’s chief executive, went for a run on the beach on Amelia Island in Florida after attending a closed-door meeting of the bank’s top stockbrokers. After just a few miles, the storm began to pick up speed, prompting Mr. Gorman to turn around and head for safety.

Mr. Gorman did not get soaked, and his company has become better at avoiding the sort of squalls that have battered the bank in recent years. Morgan Stanley’s stock is up 59 percent this year. Last month, the bank reported strong third-quarter earnings that reflected the results of Mr. Gorman’s three-year effort to reduce risk-taking and to expand into the safer business of advising people on how to manage their wealth.

“I felt for a long time that path was clear, but it was disputed and we were doubted many times,” Mr. Gorman said recently.

Morgan Stanley was known for years for its swagger and its willingness to take big trading risks. Nevertheless, it was unable to pull back in time in during the financial crisis and sustained significant losses, forcing it to take a $9 billion lifeline in 2008 from a foreign bank. That prompted Mr. Gorman to change course.

The transformation has not been easy, and Mr. Gorman still has some naysayers. Despite the strong third-quarter results, Morgan Stanley produced a return on equity of just 6.2 percent in the quarter, excluding a charge related to its credit spreads. Simply to cover its debt expenses and other capital costs, Morgan Stanley must achieve a return on equity closer to 10 percent. Mr. Gorman said he hoped the bank would hit that number by 2015.

“Last quarter, the stock market was zooming, they did well in divisions like equities, investment banking and wealth management, and despite it all, it added up to a return on equity of just 6 percent,” said Glenn Schorr, an analyst with International Strategy and Investment. “So yes, they have made a lot of progress, but there is still a lot of work to be done.”

The bank’s fixed-income department continues to be a source of some frustration. This unit, which has posted some memorable bond-trading losses, has been shedding risky assets and taking fewer gambles. Still, in the first half of 2013, Glenn Hadden, a prominent interest-rate trader at the bank who has had some successes in the past, racked up losses of more than $200 million, according to people briefed on the matter who spoke on the condition that they not be named because they were not authorized to speak on the record. Mr. Hadden, through a company spokesman, and Morgan Stanley declined to comment.

Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA, says the good news about the new strategy is these kinds of losses are becoming increasingly rare, and when they do happen, they are “containable.”

One bright spot for the bank is wealth management, where it has been investing much of its effort. That department, run by Gregory Fleming, a former Merrill Lynch president, houses the combined brokerage forces of Morgan Stanley and Citigroup. In the depths of the financial crisis, Morgan Stanley’s wealth-management unit formed a joint venture with Citigroup. This year, Morgan Stanley bought Citigroup’s stake, giving it more than 16,517 brokers worldwide.

Morgan Stanley initially struggled to absorb the unit, and it often had trouble with technology issues. Still, Mr. Fleming seems to have largely overcome those obstacles. His division posted a pretax profit margin of 19 percent in the third quarter, ahead of expectations and well ahead of results in the period a year earlier.

Mr. Gorman said that while Morgan Stanley had no immediate plans to add more financial advisers, the company was putting a greater emphasis on what it offered to its wealthy clients. Brokers who deal with the bank’s wealthiest clients say Mr. Fleming upgraded the trading desk they deal with and is expanding the products sold to top clients.

Culturally, one of the biggest challenges with the expansion into wealth management was getting Morgan Stanley’s bankers, traders and financial advisers to work together. Bankers are paid to structure mergers, and the executives they deal with often need financial advisers to manage their money. In theory, banking and retail brokerage businesses are supposed to complement each other, with one bringing the other business. But on Wall Street, it rarely works this way, because bankers tend to look down on brokers, whom they see as rather mundane.

Mr. Fleming has been trying to change this attitude. It doesn’t hurt that wealth management, not banking, drives the company’s earnings these days. Wealth management now generates almost 45 percent of Morgan Stanley’s revenue, compared with 23 percent in 2007.

“As a banker, you like wealth management a whole lot more when it is responsible for lifting the entire firm’s stock price at a place where people are paid largely in stock,” Mr. Mayo said.

Mr. Fleming, a former banker, has moved senior bankers, some of whom he worked with at Merrill Lynch, into wealth management to work with the company’s brokers.

“I recently brought in a possible deal, and someone in banking actually returned my call,” said one Morgan Stanley broker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of a firm policy against speaking to the media. “It’s harder for the firm’s bankers to call us idiots when we are driving the firm’s earnings.”

Morgan Stanley’s deal to buy the remaining Citigroup stake will also provide the company with billions of dollars in customer deposits that it plans to use to increase lending to corporations and even individual retail clients. This will include loans for residential mortgages.

The bank has $82 billion in customer deposits and expects that number to grow to about $138 billion by mid-2015.

Morgan Stanley can make a lot of money off the spread on these funds â€" the difference between what it pays its customers who own the deposits and what it can lend those deposits for.

Right now, the bank is earning less than 1 percent on these deposits. Mr. Mayo, the CLSA analyst, said Morgan Stanley’s plan could generate an additional $650 million in revenue a year on these deposits, assuming it can earn a spread of 1.7 percent, which is healthy but still lower than Bank of America’s, which is 2.4 percent, he said. This so-called spread revenue makes up just 13 percent of the wealth management division’s revenue, compared with 34 percent at Bank of America, Mr. Mayo said.

“Morgan Stanley is on the cusp of achieving its greatest benefits in wealth management,” Mr. Mayo wrote in a recent report.

Still, lending is not without risk, and this strategy has raised some eyebrows on Wall Street.

“We will be prudent and conservative,” Mr. Gorman said. “Our intent is not to be on the leading edge of risk.”



Chief’s Vision for Morgan Stanley Is Showing Some Success

Thunderclouds were gathering in April when James P. Gorman, Morgan Stanley’s chief executive, went for a run on the beach on Amelia Island in Florida after attending a closed-door meeting of the bank’s top stockbrokers. After just a few miles, the storm began to pick up speed, prompting Mr. Gorman to turn around and head for safety.

Mr. Gorman did not get soaked, and his company has become better at avoiding the sort of squalls that have battered the bank in recent years. Morgan Stanley’s stock is up 59 percent this year. Last month, the bank reported strong third-quarter earnings that reflected the results of Mr. Gorman’s three-year effort to reduce risk-taking and to expand into the safer business of advising people on how to manage their wealth.

“I felt for a long time that path was clear, but it was disputed and we were doubted many times,” Mr. Gorman said recently.

Morgan Stanley was known for years for its swagger and its willingness to take big trading risks. Nevertheless, it was unable to pull back in time in during the financial crisis and sustained significant losses, forcing it to take a $9 billion lifeline in 2008 from a foreign bank. That prompted Mr. Gorman to change course.

The transformation has not been easy, and Mr. Gorman still has some naysayers. Despite the strong third-quarter results, Morgan Stanley produced a return on equity of just 6.2 percent in the quarter, excluding a charge related to its credit spreads. Simply to cover its debt expenses and other capital costs, Morgan Stanley must achieve a return on equity closer to 10 percent. Mr. Gorman said he hoped the bank would hit that number by 2015.

“Last quarter, the stock market was zooming, they did well in divisions like equities, investment banking and wealth management, and despite it all, it added up to a return on equity of just 6 percent,” said Glenn Schorr, an analyst with International Strategy and Investment. “So yes, they have made a lot of progress, but there is still a lot of work to be done.”

The bank’s fixed-income department continues to be a source of some frustration. This unit, which has posted some memorable bond-trading losses, has been shedding risky assets and taking fewer gambles. Still, in the first half of 2013, Glenn Hadden, a prominent interest-rate trader at the bank who has had some successes in the past, racked up losses of more than $200 million, according to people briefed on the matter who spoke on the condition that they not be named because they were not authorized to speak on the record. Mr. Hadden, through a company spokesman, and Morgan Stanley declined to comment.

Mike Mayo, an analyst at CLSA, says the good news about the new strategy is these kinds of losses are becoming increasingly rare, and when they do happen, they are “containable.”

One bright spot for the bank is wealth management, where it has been investing much of its effort. That department, run by Gregory Fleming, a former Merrill Lynch president, houses the combined brokerage forces of Morgan Stanley and Citigroup. In the depths of the financial crisis, Morgan Stanley’s wealth-management unit formed a joint venture with Citigroup. This year, Morgan Stanley bought Citigroup’s stake, giving it more than 16,517 brokers worldwide.

Morgan Stanley initially struggled to absorb the unit, and it often had trouble with technology issues. Still, Mr. Fleming seems to have largely overcome those obstacles. His division posted a pretax profit margin of 19 percent in the third quarter, ahead of expectations and well ahead of results in the period a year earlier.

Mr. Gorman said that while Morgan Stanley had no immediate plans to add more financial advisers, the company was putting a greater emphasis on what it offered to its wealthy clients. Brokers who deal with the bank’s wealthiest clients say Mr. Fleming upgraded the trading desk they deal with and is expanding the products sold to top clients.

Culturally, one of the biggest challenges with the expansion into wealth management was getting Morgan Stanley’s bankers, traders and financial advisers to work together. Bankers are paid to structure mergers, and the executives they deal with often need financial advisers to manage their money. In theory, banking and retail brokerage businesses are supposed to complement each other, with one bringing the other business. But on Wall Street, it rarely works this way, because bankers tend to look down on brokers, whom they see as rather mundane.

Mr. Fleming has been trying to change this attitude. It doesn’t hurt that wealth management, not banking, drives the company’s earnings these days. Wealth management now generates almost 45 percent of Morgan Stanley’s revenue, compared with 23 percent in 2007.

“As a banker, you like wealth management a whole lot more when it is responsible for lifting the entire firm’s stock price at a place where people are paid largely in stock,” Mr. Mayo said.

Mr. Fleming, a former banker, has moved senior bankers, some of whom he worked with at Merrill Lynch, into wealth management to work with the company’s brokers.

“I recently brought in a possible deal, and someone in banking actually returned my call,” said one Morgan Stanley broker, who spoke on the condition of anonymity because of a firm policy against speaking to the media. “It’s harder for the firm’s bankers to call us idiots when we are driving the firm’s earnings.”

Morgan Stanley’s deal to buy the remaining Citigroup stake will also provide the company with billions of dollars in customer deposits that it plans to use to increase lending to corporations and even individual retail clients. This will include loans for residential mortgages.

The bank has $82 billion in customer deposits and expects that number to grow to about $138 billion by mid-2015.

Morgan Stanley can make a lot of money off the spread on these funds â€" the difference between what it pays its customers who own the deposits and what it can lend those deposits for.

Right now, the bank is earning less than 1 percent on these deposits. Mr. Mayo, the CLSA analyst, said Morgan Stanley’s plan could generate an additional $650 million in revenue a year on these deposits, assuming it can earn a spread of 1.7 percent, which is healthy but still lower than Bank of America’s, which is 2.4 percent, he said. This so-called spread revenue makes up just 13 percent of the wealth management division’s revenue, compared with 34 percent at Bank of America, Mr. Mayo said.

“Morgan Stanley is on the cusp of achieving its greatest benefits in wealth management,” Mr. Mayo wrote in a recent report.

Still, lending is not without risk, and this strategy has raised some eyebrows on Wall Street.

“We will be prudent and conservative,” Mr. Gorman said. “Our intent is not to be on the leading edge of risk.”



Hedge Fund Moguls Suddenly Turn Eyes to FedEx

Daniel S. Loeb may have broken the news of his firm’s position in FedEx earlier this week, but it turns out that at least two his fellow hedge fund moguls had the same idea in the third quarter.

The firms of three top investors â€" Mr. Loeb, George Soros and John Paulson â€" disclosed new positions in FedEx on Thursday as part of their quarterly ownership disclosures.

Here’s how it breaks down:

  • Third Point said that it had accumulated two million shares in the third quarter.
  • Soros Fund Management disclosed that it had bought 1.5 million shares and call options representing an additional 375,000 shares.
  • Paulson & Company showed that it had bought 646,800 shares.

It’s a bit curious that all three purchased positions in FedEx during the same quarter. Perhaps they were inspired after the company’s stock began rising this summer, when investors speculated that the delivery service would be the subject of an activist campaign.

But the hedge fund at the center of those rumors wasn’t any of them: It was William A. Ackman’s Pershing Square Capital Management, which said in July that it was building a position in a large-capitalization investment-grade company that was trading at a lower value than its main competitor.

That turned out to be Air Products and Chemicals. Pershing’s latest investment disclosure showed that the hedge fund had not bought into FedEx.

FedEx has already made efforts to improve its stock price all the same, including a share-buyback program and cost-cutting efforts that include staff buyouts and lower spending on new planes.

While early, that campaign may already be bearing fruit: FedEx’s profit for the quarter ended Aug. 31 rose 6.5 percent compared with results in the period a year earlier, to $489 million.

What Third Point and its rivals hope will happen at FedEx going forward is unclear. But Mr. Loeb disclosed at the DealBook conference on Tuesday that he met with the company’s founder and chief executive, Frederick W. Smith, at FedEx’s headquarters in Memphis last month.

Mr. Loeb had nothing but praise for the company chief, whom he described as “great” and “absolutely not” someone he wanted to oust.

“We had a very constructive discussion about the company,” the hedge fund manager said. “We had some ideas, we shared them. I think he disabused us of some of our notions. Life goes on.”



When a Deal Goes Bad, Blame the Ratings

When a Deal Goes Bad, Blame the Ratings

Did you make an incredibly bad decision during the great credit bubble?

Don’t worry. Join the crowd denying responsibility. Explain that nobody should have expected you to do any homework before investing.

Until now, my favorite denial of responsibility had come from MBIA, the bond insurance company. It had insured some very risky mortgage-backed securities without doing much to inspect what it was insuring.

“It would be enormously expensive, even if it were logistically feasible, for a credit insurer to investigate the health of these ground-level loans,” MBIA argued in a suit against Merrill Lynch, contending that Merrill Lynch lied about the quality of loans backing the securities that MBIA insured.

MBIA explained that if it did such research, it would have to charge much higher premiums. MBIA said its premiums were as low as $77,500 for each $100 million of insurance.

My new favorite denial came this week, when the trustee for two Bear Stearns hedge funds that went broke in 2007 said it was absolutely not the managers’ fault.

They bought some of the more dubious securities around â€" securities whose payment depended on securities that in turn depended on securities that depended on subprime mortgages â€" while knowing little about what they were buying.

Those securities paid a low return, but the managers got around that by borrowing as much as 10 times the actual capital invested in the initial fund. Their second fund â€" the “enhanced leverage fund” â€" promised even better returns by borrowing more money. It was started in August 2006, with timing that could not have been much worse, and was destroyed within a year.

The way the funds’ trustees see it, all of the blame should go to the ratings agencies â€" Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. They gave ratings of AAA and AA to securities that turned out to be junk, and the managers rightly relied on those ratings. “Market participants, such as the funds, did not and could not know the loan level detail of the mortgages underlying the structured finance products at issue,” the suit states.

Could not? MBIA could claim it could not afford to do due diligence, given the low premiums it took in, but hedge fund management fees are anything but low. Could the fund managers not do the research?

I have gone over several of the investments cited in the suit and can confirm that there is little public information available. Presumably money managers could have gained more information about deals they purchased. But even then, it would have been difficult.

Before going further into that, what follows is a short primer on the private-label R.M.B.S. (residential mortgage-backed securities) market and the related C.D.O. (collateralized debt obligation) market.

The R.M.B.S. market is relatively straightforward. A bunch of mortgages are put together into a securitization, with several tranches of securities. The senior tranches of securities pay relatively low interest rates but are first in line to collect mortgage payments. Lower tranches get higher rates but will become worthless sooner if enough homeowners default.

What made this market possible was the conclusion â€" eagerly endorsed by the rating agencies â€" that tranches secured by risky assets, like subprime mortgages, could nonetheless receive AAA ratings, signifying virtually no risk. That was because there were extra mortgages in the pool and because more junior tranches would lose money first.

It was not that difficult to obtain some decent information about the mortgages in any particular R.M.B.S. deal, although it later turned out that those making the loans had often failed to live up to their promises about the creditworthiness of borrowers. But that information generally became available only weeks after the deal was sold to investors. The rating agencies rated, and the funds bought, based on what the sponsors said would be included. By the time the real information was available, fund managers presumably had moved on to other investments.

C.D.O.’s took that one step further. What backed a C.D.O. was not mortgages; it was tranches from previous mortgage securitizations. The rating agencies concluded you could take a bunch of R.M.B.S. tranches with relatively low ratings, like A, put them together, and create more AAA-rated paper.

Some of what the Bear Stearns funds bought was what we will call normal C.D.O.’s. I managed to obtain offering documents for some of those cited in the lawsuit but learned little about the actual investments. The offering documents described the tranches they would acquire in broad, general terms but gave no specifics. Presumably those specifics later became available, but researching them would have taken a great amount of effort.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.



When a Deal Goes Bad, Blame the Ratings

When a Deal Goes Bad, Blame the Ratings

Did you make an incredibly bad decision during the great credit bubble?

Don’t worry. Join the crowd denying responsibility. Explain that nobody should have expected you to do any homework before investing.

Until now, my favorite denial of responsibility had come from MBIA, the bond insurance company. It had insured some very risky mortgage-backed securities without doing much to inspect what it was insuring.

“It would be enormously expensive, even if it were logistically feasible, for a credit insurer to investigate the health of these ground-level loans,” MBIA argued in a suit against Merrill Lynch, contending that Merrill Lynch lied about the quality of loans backing the securities that MBIA insured.

MBIA explained that if it did such research, it would have to charge much higher premiums. MBIA said its premiums were as low as $77,500 for each $100 million of insurance.

My new favorite denial came this week, when the trustee for two Bear Stearns hedge funds that went broke in 2007 said it was absolutely not the managers’ fault.

They bought some of the more dubious securities around â€" securities whose payment depended on securities that in turn depended on securities that depended on subprime mortgages â€" while knowing little about what they were buying.

Those securities paid a low return, but the managers got around that by borrowing as much as 10 times the actual capital invested in the initial fund. Their second fund â€" the “enhanced leverage fund” â€" promised even better returns by borrowing more money. It was started in August 2006, with timing that could not have been much worse, and was destroyed within a year.

The way the funds’ trustees see it, all of the blame should go to the ratings agencies â€" Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch. They gave ratings of AAA and AA to securities that turned out to be junk, and the managers rightly relied on those ratings. “Market participants, such as the funds, did not and could not know the loan level detail of the mortgages underlying the structured finance products at issue,” the suit states.

Could not? MBIA could claim it could not afford to do due diligence, given the low premiums it took in, but hedge fund management fees are anything but low. Could the fund managers not do the research?

I have gone over several of the investments cited in the suit and can confirm that there is little public information available. Presumably money managers could have gained more information about deals they purchased. But even then, it would have been difficult.

Before going further into that, what follows is a short primer on the private-label R.M.B.S. (residential mortgage-backed securities) market and the related C.D.O. (collateralized debt obligation) market.

The R.M.B.S. market is relatively straightforward. A bunch of mortgages are put together into a securitization, with several tranches of securities. The senior tranches of securities pay relatively low interest rates but are first in line to collect mortgage payments. Lower tranches get higher rates but will become worthless sooner if enough homeowners default.

What made this market possible was the conclusion â€" eagerly endorsed by the rating agencies â€" that tranches secured by risky assets, like subprime mortgages, could nonetheless receive AAA ratings, signifying virtually no risk. That was because there were extra mortgages in the pool and because more junior tranches would lose money first.

It was not that difficult to obtain some decent information about the mortgages in any particular R.M.B.S. deal, although it later turned out that those making the loans had often failed to live up to their promises about the creditworthiness of borrowers. But that information generally became available only weeks after the deal was sold to investors. The rating agencies rated, and the funds bought, based on what the sponsors said would be included. By the time the real information was available, fund managers presumably had moved on to other investments.

C.D.O.’s took that one step further. What backed a C.D.O. was not mortgages; it was tranches from previous mortgage securitizations. The rating agencies concluded you could take a bunch of R.M.B.S. tranches with relatively low ratings, like A, put them together, and create more AAA-rated paper.

Some of what the Bear Stearns funds bought was what we will call normal C.D.O.’s. I managed to obtain offering documents for some of those cited in the lawsuit but learned little about the actual investments. The offering documents described the tranches they would acquire in broad, general terms but gave no specifics. Presumably those specifics later became available, but researching them would have taken a great amount of effort.

Floyd Norris comments on finance and the economy at nytimes.com/economix.



New York Regulator to Explore Bitcoin License

New York’s top financial regulator is looking at issuing a “BitLicense” for businesses that conduct transactions in virtual currency like bitcoin.

Benjamin Lawsky, the state’s superintendent of financial services, announced on Thursday that he would conduct a public hearing to discuss the burgeoning world of digital money. Participants will discuss the feasibility of a license that would make the virtual currency market more like those for other forms of money.

If the plans go ahead, it would be an important step in bringing bitcoin and other virtual currencies closer to the financial mainstream. In another move in the same direction, the Federal Election Commission held a hearing on Thursday at which it considered whether to legalize campaign donations made in virtual currencies.

Since bitcoin was created in 2009 by anonymous programmers, it has frequently been treated with derision by many financial insiders and authorities, who have described it as a speculative mania. Many authorities still hold to that position, but the currency’s online network, which is not controlled by any centralized authority, has survived several crises.

On Thursday, the value of a single bitcoin was trading near an all-time high, at $425, on the exchange Mt. Gox. The price has skyrocketed in recent weeks.

Several regulators have been looking at ways to make sure virtual money cannot be used for laundering money or other criminal purposes. In October, the federal authorities arrested the operator of an online marketplace where they said bitcoin could be used to buy drugs and other illegal goods.

“The cloak of anonymity provided by virtual currencies has helped support dangerous criminal activity, such as drug smuggling, money laundering, gun running and child pornography,” Mr. Lawsky said in a letter announcing the hearing, which has not yet been scheduled.

But Mr. Lawsky indicated that there could be important and legitimate uses for new forms of money.

“The virtual currency industry represents a new frontier in electronic commerce, and it is important that regulators obtain the necessary information,” he said.



Kimberly-Clark to Spin Off Health Care Unit

Kimberly-Clark said on Thursday that it would pursue a potential spin-off its health care business, becoming the latest company to slim down its operations to help bolster its stock price.

The business that would be separated focuses on selling surgical and anti-infection products and medical devices for pain management, respiratory and digestive health. It reported $1.6 billion in sales last year, a fraction of Kimberly-Clark’s $21.1 billion in revenue.

“While K-C Health Care has been part of our company since the 1970s, its strategic fit and growth priorities have changed over time and we now think that pursuing a spin-off makes sense for our shareholders,” Thomas J. Falk, Kimberly-Clark’s chairman and chief executive, said in a statement.

Kimberly-Clark would be making the move from a position of relative strength: its stock has risen about 30 percent so far this year, closing on Thursday at $109.71. (In after-hours trading, the company’s shares jumped 6.4 percent to $116.75.)

If the company’s board authorizes the move, the health care unit would likely be publicly traded by the third quarter of 2014.

Kimberly-Clark is being advised by Morgan Stanley.



SAC’s Cohen Sells Warhols and a Richter at Art Auctions

It was a question whispered throughout this week’s contemporary art auctions at Sotheby’s and Christie’s: “How’s Steve’s stuff selling?”

Steven A. Cohen, the hedge fund billionaire, has long been a subject of fascination in the art world, as he amassed one of the world’s most eclectic and valuable private collections. This season, Mr. Cohen raised eyebrows by putting up for sale the largest single group of works he has sold at one time. He also drew heightened scrutiny because the sales coincided with a guilty plea by Mr. Cohen’s firm, SAC Capital Advisors, on insider trading charges.

All told, Mr. Cohen’s sales raised about $88 million. It is unclear, however, exactly how much Mr. Cohen made from the sales because prior to the auction, Sotheby’s â€" where he sold the majority of his works â€" had given him a guarantee. In other words, Mr. Cohen received an undisclosed sum of money for many of the pieces, regardless of the sale’s outcome.

People close to Mr. Cohen said that the sales had nothing to do with his mounting legal bills and financial penalties. As part of its settlement with the government, SAC has agreed to pay fines of $1.8 billion, money that will be paid directly by Mr. Cohen, who owns 100 percent of his firm.

Instead, they say that the sales are reflective of Mr. Cohen’s trading instincts. For years, Mr. Cohen, 57, has been both a big buyer and a big seller. In selling a swath of works now, Mr. Cohen is taking advantage of a frothy market and culling his collection.

On Wednesday night at Sotheby’s, Mr. Cohen’s most successful dispositions were two abstract canvases, one by Gerhard Richter and the other by Brice Marden.

“A.B. Courbet,” a painting by Richter from 1986 fetched $26.4 million, exceeding the $20 million high estimate. It was bought by a telephone bidder from Mexico. Mr. Cohen had purchased the Richter last year at
Art Basel for around $20 million.

He got $10.9 million for “The Attended,” a Marden painting from 1996-9 filled with looping colors of red, yellow, green and white. It had a $7 million to $10 million estimate.

There were disappointments. Surprisingly, two Andy Warhols that Mr. Cohen had put on the block sold at the low end of their estimated ranges.

“Liz #1 (Early Colored Liz),” from 1963, estimated to sell for $20 million to $30 million, sold for $20.3 million. The square canvas depicts Elizabeth Taylor’s face on a bright yellow background. “5 Deaths on Turquoise,” from the artist’s celebrated Death and Disaster series, sold for $7.3 million. (A related piece from that series, “Silver Car Crash (Double Disaster),” sold to a telephone bidder for $105.4 million, the highest price ever paid at auction for a Warhol.)

And a work by the Italian artist Maurizio Cattelan â€" “Spermini,” a wall of latex masks of the artist’s face â€" failed to sell at all.

In the past, Mr. Cohen has occasionally put his name on works that he’s selling. This season, however, amid his legal woes, the catalogs did not designate him as a seller. But dealers familiar with his collection were more than eager to point out his holdings.

It is not known whether Mr. Cohen attended the auctions, or bought anything. While he was not seen in the audience, he could have been secreted away in a skybox overlooking the sales room.

Several of Mr. Cohen’s hedge fund peers were in the crowd, including Daniel Loeb of Third Point and David Ganek, formerly of Level Global Investors. A former protégé of Mr. Cohen’s at SAC, Mr. Ganek shut down his hedge fund after becoming ensnared by the government’s insider trading investigation. Mr. Ganek was never charged.

Mr. Cohen has not been criminally charged in the government’s case against SAC. But speaking this week at a DealBook conference, Preet Bharara, the United States attorney in Manhattan, reiterated that SAC’s guilty plea did not provide any individuals immunity from prosecution.

“The criminal case, generally speaking, remains open,” Mr. Bharara said.



A Sign of Desperation in Facebook’s Snapchat Offer

Facebook’s Snapchat bid shows triple the desperation. The social network paid $1 billion for no-revenue Instagram a little over a year ago. Now, it’s said to be dangling as much as $3 billion to lure in a mobile app that sends self-destructing digital images. Facebook’s apparently escalating need to buy off marauders at its moat suggests its defenses may be scalable.

Coming just months before its initial public offering, Facebook had obvious reasons to buy Instagram. Consumers were spending more time on mobile devices, instead of desktop computers. This was listed as a “risk factor” in its prospectus for its initial public offering as the social network still hadn’t figured out how to make money on mobile advertising. More important, it faced the risk that users might migrate to a rival optimized for smartphone usage.

Buying Instagram gave Mark Zuckerberg’s dorm room creation 30 million mobile users in a flash. The business has grown fast â€" it now has well over than 150 million. Facebook is just starting to roll out ads on Instagram, but the purchase looks to be working. If Facebook does buy Snapchat, it would be based on the idea that it can replicate its success with Instagram.

Snapchat has similarly astounding growth. In September, its users were sending 350 million photos a day, up from 200 million in June. Moreover, Snapchat’s young users tend to stick with the service and use it more frequently. Selling ads on a service most famous for its sexting potential might be a challenge, but similar questions have been raised about promotions on social networks from the start. And Snapchat isn’t entirely a substitute for Facebook, so this isn’t a zero-sum game. It may be more about grabbing a larger slice of an expanding pie.

Still, there’s a disquieting element about a company spending billions for a simple application it could almost certainly have replicated for next to nothing. Facebook’s acknowledgment that teenagers are using its service less on a daily basis may signify the social network is losing its edge among the ranks of new technology adapters. That it is also now willing to shell out $3 billion to snuff out a rival in its infancy brings with it a whiff of desperation.

Robert Cyran is a columnist for Reuters Breakingviews. For more independent commentary and analysis, visit breakingviews.com.



Starboard Joins Fight Over Fate of Compuware

Compuware has already spent the better part of the year fending off one activist shareholder. Now it faces another.

Starboard Value, a hedge fund, disclosed Thursday that it owns a 5 percent stake in the business software maker. It also urged the company to consider a sale or other strategic changes.

“While either outcome would be acceptable to us, we believe the company has been in strategic limbo for far too long,” Jeffrey C. Smith, Starboard’s managing member, wrote in a letter to Compuware’s management. “It is time for Compuware to either sell itself now for an acceptable premium or execute and expand upon its previously announced standalone value creation plan.”

The appearance of Starboard comes just under a year after another firm, Elliott Management, bid $2.3 billion for the software maker. Elliott, a veteran activist, is seeking to push Compuware into a sale of itself and has argued privately that a number of potential buyers have expressed interest.

Compuware rejected Elliott’s proposal in January, calling it lacking compared to its own turnaround plan, which included moves like spinning off its Covisint business communications software unit.

Last month, the company said that its revival efforts contributed to a 53 percent jump in profit for the quarter ended Sept. 30, to $16.3 million.

Starboard, which has pushed for change at companies including AOL and Smithfield Foods, isn’t necessarily endorsing a sale of the whole company. Its other proposals include a $450 million stock buyback at $10.50 to $12 a share; the sale of noncore assets; and an increase of its dividend.

“While we believe that both options could unlock significant value, it is critical for the company to analyze the risk-adjusted present value of each alternative in order to determine which alternative represents the best means for maximizing shareholder value,” Mr. Smith wrote.

But Starboard also warned that it has little faith in the company’s directors to oversee a self-help plan. The hedge fund said that it wanted to see further change to the board, such as by adding more new members and people with more experience in the software industry.



Morning Agenda: A Member of China’s Elite Tied to JPMorgan

JPMORGAN’S TIES TO A MEMBER OF CHINA’S ELITE  | 

“To promote its standing in China, JPMorgan Chase turned to a seemingly obscure consulting firm run by a 32-year-old executive named Lily Chang,” David Barboza, Jessica Silver-Greenberg and Ben Protess report in DealBook. “Ms. Chang’s firm, which received a $75,000-a-month contract from JPMorgan, appeared to have only two employees. And on the surface, Ms. Chang lacked the influence and public name recognition needed to unlock business for the bank.

“But what was known to JPMorgan executives in Hong Kong, and some executives at other major companies, was that ‘Lily Chang’ was not her real name. It was an alias for Wen Ruchun, the only daughter of Wen Jiabao, who at the time was China’s prime minister, with oversight of the economy and its financial institutions.

“JPMorgan’s link to Ms. Wen â€" which came during a time when the bank also invested in companies tied to the Wen family â€" has not been previously reported. Yet a review by The New York Times of confidential documents, Chinese public records and interviews with people briefed on the contract shows that the relationship pointed to a broader strategy for accumulating influence in China: Put the relatives of the nation’s ruling elite on the payroll.

“Now, United States authorities are scrutinizing JPMorgan’s ties to Ms. Wen, whose alias was government approved, as part of a wider bribery investigation into whether the bank swapped contracts and jobs for business deals with state-owned Chinese companies, according to the documents and interviews. The bank, which is cooperating with the inquiries and conducting its own internal review, has not been accused of any wrongdoing.”

A TWITTER #FAIL FOR JPMORGAN  | 

JPMorgan Chase, which helped take Twitter public last week, got a very negative taste of the social network’s power on Wednesday evening. The bank canceled a question-and-answer session with James B. Lee Jr., its vice chairman and top deal maker, after Twitter users responded to its request for serious questions with a stream of hostile jokes, DealBook’s Michael J. de la Merced reports.

A spokesman for the firm wrote in an email: “#Badidea! Back to the drawing board!” No one will lose their jobs over the fracas, a person briefed on the matter tells Mr. de la Merced.

SNAPCHAT REJECTS BILLIONS  | 
Snapchat has joined the list of tech companies â€" like Tumblr and Instagram â€" with no money coming in but multiple sky-high takeover offers, Jenna Wortham reports in The New York Times. The leaders of the social media service, who until last month worked out of a beachfront bungalow in Venice, Calif., have balked at the offers, according to three people with knowledge of the overtures, including a recent multibillion-dollar proposal from Facebook.

Facebook’s offer? “Close to $3 billion or more,” all in cash, according to The Wall Street Journal, which cites unidentified people briefed on the matter.

It’s not that Snapchat’s leaders don’t want billions of dollars, Ms. Wortham writes. “In part, it’s because they think making a deal now would leave many billions more on the table.”

ON THE AGENDA  | 
Janet L. Yellen, President Obama’s choice to lead the Federal Reserve, goes before the Senate Banking committee for a confirmation hearing. Gary Kaminsky, a Morgan Stanley vice chairman, is on CNBC at 7 a.m. Walmart Stores, Viacom and Tyco International report earnings before the market opens, while Nordstrom reports earnings this evening.

TAX WIZARDRY THROUGH AN OFFBEAT MERGER  | 

Classic tax shelters used in the 1990s have become unattractive to most companies, thanks to enforcement actions by the Internal Revenue Service, coupled with changes in accounting and reporting requirements, Victor Fleischer writes in DealBook. Yet executives and tax directors have found other ways to avoid taxes â€" taking advantage of tax rules written in the days when assets were tangible and difficult to move: “For multinational corporations, the most common method of tax avoidance relies on moving intellectual property overseas, where profits derived from those assets can be sheltered in low-tax jurisdictions.”

“Other methods of tax avoidance have received less news media attention but are no less troubling. A recent deal by LIN Media, a media company backed by the private equity firm HM Capital Partners and the investment manager Royal W. Carson III, highlights two techniques. LIN Media owns 43 local television stations around the country, including the CBS affiliate WIVB in Buffalo, the Fox affiliate KHON in Honolulu and the CBS affiliate WISH in Indianapolis, along with other media assets,” Mr. Fleischer writes.

“In July, it merged with itself. Who knew this was possible? While the merger was trivial from a business standpoint, it generated half a billion dollars in tax losses that the company used to shelter its gain from an earlier deal and eliminate its tax liability.”

Mergers & Acquisitions »

Concession in Airline Deal Is Criticized  |  In reaching a settlement with US Airways and American Airlines, the Justice Department had a far different view than it expressed when it initially filed suit to block the proposed merger.
NEW YORK TIMES

Petrobras of Brazil Sells Peruvian Unit to Chinese CompanyPetrobras of Brazil Sells Peruvian Unit to Chinese Company  |  The sale by Petrobras of its Peruvian subsidiary, Petrobras Energia Peru, to the China National Petroleum Company for $2.6 billion is aimed at shoring up Petrobras’s balance sheet.
DealBook »

Executives Have a Knack for Well-Timed Stock Sales  |  The Wall Street Journal reports: “Ordinary investors often are dismayed when senior executives sell their own stock before hitting the market with bad news. The situation can be even stickier when corporate insiders declare their company’s outlook bright, sell shares, then disclose bad news.”
WALL STREET JOURNAL

Telefonica Says No Plans to Take Control of Telecom Italia  |  The chairman of Telefónica of Spain told an Italian newspaper that the company does not plan to exercise an option to increase to 100 percent its stake in Telco, the company that controls Telecom Italia, Reuters reports.
REUTERS

INVESTMENT BANKING »

Goldman Sachs Promotes 280 to Managing DirectorGoldman Sachs Promotes 280 to Managing Director  |  Promotions are up 5 percent over last year, when the Wall Street firm named 266 employees managing director.
DealBook »

Goldman Sachs Is Said to Lose Executives in Brazil  |  Goldman Sachs “lost at least nine managing directors in Brazil this year as revenue from investment banking falls and trading and wealth-management fees increase, four people familiar with the matter said,” Bloomberg News reports.
BLOOMBERG NEWS

Perella Weinberg Hires Goldman Sachs Managing Director  |  Perella Weinberg Partners has hired Jonathan Prather, a managing director within Goldman Sachs’s global industrials group, as a partner in its advisory business.
DealBook »

After Leave of Absence, Barclays Executive ResignsAfter Leave of Absence, Barclays Executive Resigns  |  The bank said Hector W. Sants would not return to his post as compliance chief after taking a leave of absence because of exhaustion and stress last month.
DealBook »

Finance Lessons, From the World of Art Auctions  |  The $142 million sale of Francis Bacon’s triptych of Lucian Freud has a matching, perhaps a bit tenuous, trio of lessons for the broader world of finance, Richard Beales of Reuters Breakingviews writes.
REUTERS BREAKINGVIEWS

PRIVATE EQUITY »

Carlyle-Backed Brazilian Tour Operator Plans Stock OfferingCarlyle-Backed Brazilian Tour Operator Plans Stock Offering  |  A Brazilian tour operator backed by the Carlyle Group could raise as much as 1 billion reais ($428 million) for its existing shareholders through a planned offering.
DealBook »

HEDGE FUNDS »

Short Sellers Place Bets Against Twitter  |  The Financial Times reports: “Investors have wasted little time betting against shares in Twitter after short sellers were afforded their first opportunity on Wednesday to profit from a fall in the messaging platform’s stock price.”
FINANCIAL TIMES

I.P.O./OFFERINGS »

Chegg Falls in Debut, but Chief Remains EbullientChegg Falls in Debut, but Chief Remains Ebullient  |  As of midday on Wednesday, shares in the company, which primarily rents textbooks via its website, were down 20 percent below their initial public offering price.
DealBook »

VENTURE CAPITAL »

Redfin Raises $50 Million in Latest Financing Round  |  The online real estate brokerage has raised $50 million in a new round of mezzanine capital, led by Tiger Global Management and T. Rowe Price. Five existing investors, including Greylock Partners and DFJ Venture Capital, also participated.
DealBook »

Former Government Official Joins Bitcoin Start-Up  |  Raj Date, a former official at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, has joined the board of Circle Internet Financial, which is trying to help the virtual currency bitcoin have a wider use, The Wall Street Journal reports.
WALL STREET JOURNAL

LEGAL/REGULATORY »

Coffey to Join Kramer Levin in a Return to Law PracticeCoffey to Join Kramer Levin in a Return to Law Practice  |  Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel is expected to announce on Thursday that it has hired John P. Coffey, known as Sean, to be the chairman of its complex litigation group.
DealBook »

Euro Zone Economy Stagnates as German Growth Slows  |  “The euro zone economy marked time in the third quarter of the year, growing just 0.1 percent from the second quarter, disappointing hopes that a full-fledged recovery was finally taking hold after five years of recession and stagnation,” The New York Times reports.
NEW YORK TIMES

Tax Authorities in Italy Scrutinize Apple  |  The New York Times reports: “Italian prosecutors have opened an investigation into whether Apple paid all its taxes in the country, an official in Milan said on Wednesday.”
NEW YORK TIMES

In Senate Remarks, Yellen to Support Stimulus Plan  |  The New York Times reports: “Janet L. Yellen, President Obama’s choice to lead the Federal Reserve for the next four years, plans to tell senators at her confirmation hearing on Thursday that continuing the Fed’s enormous stimulus campaign is the best way to revive the economy and hasten the program’s end.”
NEW YORK TIMES

Lawyer Admits Mistakes in Chevron Case  |  Steven R. Donziger, the freelance lawyer who has been suing Chevron for 20 years over pollution of the Ecuadorean Amazon jungle, admits in prepared testimony that he concealed his relationship and payments to a court-appointed expert witness who presented a report to the Ecuadorean court that tried the case, The New York Times reports.
NEW YORK TIMES