âWeâre willing to pay $600 million because we have a business to run and donât want this hanging over our heads with litigation that could last for years.â
Thatâs what Steven A. Cohenâs lawyer told a judge just four months ago to justify why Mr. Cohen had agreed to pay $616 million to the Securities and Exchange Commission to settle civil accusations that his firm was involved in insider trading without admitting or denying guilt.
If that explanation sounded like a payoff â" âbuying off the U.S. governmentâ is the way John Cassidy of The New Yorker put it at the time â" thatâs because, with hindsight, thatâs what it was.
But it didnât work.
The S.E.C., having been shamed by critics for making what seemed like a deferential deal, returned with a new civil action against Mr. Cohen individually on Friday, seeking to bar him from the industry.
The new charges and evidence raise all sorts of questions. But within the legal community, one question is now particularly baffling: Why did Mr. Cohen pay more than half a billion dollars to settle a case that now appears far from settled?
âItâs hard to believe he got bad advice. Itâs not like heâs using some street-corner lawyer,â said Jacob S. Frenkel, a former S.E.C. enforcement lawyer who is now a partner at Shulman Rogers Gandal Pordy & Ecker.
Within Mr. Cohenâs legal camp, which includes Paul, Weiss and WilmerHale, the new civil action came as a surprise, according to people involved in the case. His legal team had thought that by settling with the S.E.C. in March for such a large sum it would be unlikely that the agency would come back for more, despite assertions by the S.E.C. that it reserved the right to pursue additional charges against Mr. Cohen.
At minimum, Mr. Cohenâs lawyers thought they would be able to talk the S.E.C. out of bringing a fraud charge against their client, these people said. In that regard, they succeeded. But they never imagined the S.E.C. would bring an administrative claim of âfailure to superviseâ against Mr. Cohen, which, to their way of thinking, would be an admission of defeat by the S.E.C. because it would be perceived as a demonstration of weakness, the equivalent of charging Al Capone with tax evasion.
âThe S.E.C. created expectations in the settlement by strong inference,â Mr. Frenkel said. âThere is an expectation of reasonable closure.â
But Mr. Cohenâs lawyers â" and perhaps everyone else â" missed the larger picture: The S.E.C.âs âfailure to superviseâ case can still have the same effect as a more damning fraud charge because it has the potential to put his firm out of business.
When Mr. Cohenâs $616 million settlement was first presented to Judge Victor Marrero of Federal District Court in Manhattan, he resisted approving it, saying aloud what so many people were thinking at the time, âThere is something counterintuitive and incongruous about settling for $600 million if it truly did nothing wrong.â
What Judge Marrero didnât appreciate â" and what the public may have missed as well â" was the math behind why the whopping settlement arguably made sense if it would end the decade-long investigation into Mr. Cohen.
The goal of the settlement, and its timing, were clearly aimed at assuaging nervous investors in Mr. Cohenâs fund so that they wouldnât seek the return of their money. Mr. Cohen managed $15 billion, including about $8 billion of his own money. The remaining $7 billion comes from outside investors â" and it is worth big fees to the firm. Mr. Cohen collects a 3 percent âmanagement feeâ and takes upward of 50 percent of profits. On $7 billion, if you follow the math, annual management fees collected can total as much as $210 million. If the firm can produce profits of as little as 10 percent, the firm can collect $350 million more. If the firm produces 30 percent returns, its historical average, the fee could jump to more than $1 billion.
Consequently, a settlement payment of $616 million could pay for itself in a year or two.
That was then. Now, that $616 million settlement appears to be a down payment on a much longer soap opera that could still include a criminal case down the road.
When Mr. Cohen made his original settlement agreement, the S.E.C.âs leadership was in transition, a clear red flag from a tactical perspective. With the addition of Mary Jo White a month after the deal was reached, she pressed to continue the investigation, and ultimately, the new action.
While the S.E.C. under Ms. White clearly didnât rescind its previous agreement, the new civil action could have one adverse outcome: it could make the agencyâs job more complicated in future investigations.
âThis could impact the approach to cooperation,â Mr. Frenkel said. âYou have to believe whatever ambiguities existed were intentional on the S.E.C.âs part. It calls into question whether the agency negotiated in good faith.â
Maybe so. But after years of Wall Street executives appearing to outnegotiate the S.E.C., it finally seems as if the agency won a round.
Andrew Ross Sorkin is the editor-at-large of DealBook. Twitter: @andrewrsorkin